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Abstract
1 This paper is about how to build an account of the normativity of logic
around the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking. I take the claim that logic
is constitutive of thinking to mean that representational activity must tend to
conform to logic to count as thinking. 2 I develop a natural line of thought about
how to develop the constitutive position into an account of logical normativity
by drawing on constitutivism in metaethics. 3 I argue that, while this line of
thought provides some insights, it is importantly incomplete, as it is unable to
explain why we should think. I consider two attempts at rescuing the line of
thought. The first, unsuccessful response is that it is self-defeating to ask why we
ought to think. The second response is that we need to think. But this response
secures normativity only if thinking has some connection to human flourishing.
4 I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing. Logic is normative
because it is constitutive of this good. 5 I show that the resulting account deals
nicely with problems that vex other accounts of logical normativity.
1 Introduction
Discussions of how logic relates to thinking tend to take one of two approaches. Some
emphasize that logic is normative for thinking: it tells us how we ought to think, or
what it is to think well. Others emphasize that logic is constitutive of thinking: it
tells us what it is to think at all.1 This paper is about how to bring these approaches
together. In particular, the paper is about how to build an account of the normativity
of logic around the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking.
Let me start with some background. First, the term ‘thinking’ is used in various
ways. Sometimes it is used as a catch-all for activity with representational content
– as, for example, by Descartes in the Second Meditation: ‘Well, then, what am
I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms,
denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.’ I am using the term in a
more discriminating sense. ‘Thinking’ is not a term for the genus, representational
activity, but for a particular species of representational activity. I take thinking to be
the representational activity composed of acts of judging and inferring, acts whose
contents are propositions or ‘thoughts’. In a full account of thinking, we might also
want to include acts such as entertaining a thought or reasoning under a supposition,
but in this paper I leave these aside to focus on the core cases. I’m also assuming, for
1For the former approach, see Field (2009). For the latter approach, see Putnam (1994, 247).
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purposes of this paper, that judging is binary rather than allowing for varying degrees
of confidence.2
Second, many discussions of the normativity of logic use ‘logic’ to refer to a theory
of the sort produced by logicians, or to the discipline to which these theories belong.3
Typically, these theories are about a consequence relation that holds among sentences
of a formal language. This is not what I will mean by ‘logic’. I will mean a set of
inference-rules that apply to thoughts in virtue of the way they are composed. For
example, take Modus Ponens:
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, infer q.4
It is a nice question whether the consequence relation generated by the logical rules
applicable to thoughts coincides with any consequence relation studied by logicians,
such as classical or intuitionistic consequence, but since nothing in this paper turns
on this issue, I take no stand on it here. Throughout the paper, I will use rules such as
Modus Ponens as examples, but nothing turns on any particularities of these rules; if
you’re persuaded by counterexamples to Modus Ponens (McGee 1985; Kolodny and
MacFarlane 2010), you can substitute a different example.
There are several further assumptions I’m going to make about logic so that I can
focus on the question this paper is really about. I’m going to assume that we have a
way of demarcating logical from non-logical rules. I’m going to assume, contrary to
the arguments of logical pluralists (Beall and Restall 2005; Shapiro 2014), that there
is a unique set of rules that govern thoughts – what is often referred to as the ‘One
True Logic’. The relation between pluralism and logical normativity is too complex to
address here (Kissel and Shapiro 2017; Blake-Turner and Russell 2018; Steinberger
2019b). It’s worth noting, though, that my arguments would also hold on the weaker
view that, while there are multiple correct logics, there is a ‘minimal kit’ (Finn 2019;
Hale 2002, 299) of rules that hold in any correct logic.5
2If we instead conceived of judging in terms of degrees, we might hold that the axioms of probability
have a constitutive role similar to that which I assume for logic in this paper; it might then be possible
to give an account of the normativity of those axioms similar to the account I propose for logic. This
suggestion could find additional support in the claim that the axioms of probability are merely ‘a way of
applying standard logic to beliefs, when beliefs are seen as graded’ (Christensen 2004, 15). But without
a detailed consideration of whether logic and probability are so closely related, I prefer to leave this
issue open. In sections 2 and 5 I flag two places where relaxing the binary assumption might make a
difference to the argument.
3For example, in arguing that logic isn’t normative, Russell (2020) takes the thing that isn’t normative
to be a theory specifying a consequence relation on a language.
4It’s natural to write down logical rules as imperatives, but this notational choice is not meant to
beg any philosophical questions: in particular, it is not meant to suggest that the rule on its own has
normative force. For this point, see Harman (1986, 5) and for some comments on how my view relates
to Harman’s, see section 5 below. For present purposes, all we need is a way of specifying the class of
transitions that the rule licenses.
5It would also seem reasonable to allow for thinkers who follow rules that are proof-theoretically
equivalent to those that are required for thinking.
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Most importantly, I am going to assume that logic is constitutive of thinking. When
I say that logic is ‘constitutive’ of thinking, I mean that representational activity must
tend to conform to logical rules if it is to count as thinking at all. To be clear, this
doesn’t exclude the possibility that thinking is also constituted by some non-deductive
– or even non-logical – inference-rules. It states a necessary condition for thinking, not
a sufficient one. By way of initial motivation for this position, observe that there seems
to be a limit on just how illogical someone’s representational activity can be while
they still count as thinking. As Jane Heal (1989, 89) puts it, ‘completely unsuccessful
and chaotic thought, thought in which no shred of truth or rational connectedness is
discernible, is an incoherent notion.’ This limit on illogicality is just the flip-side of
the constitutive role of logic.
In fact, there is not just one constitutive position but a family of positions, all of
which hold that some conformity to logic is required for thinking, but which vary
according to the kind and extent of conformity required. The strongest constitutive
view, that thinking requires perfect conformity to logical rules, is held by Kimhi (2018)
and has been attributed to Kant (Putnam 1994; Tolley 2006) and to Wittgenstein
(Conant 1992). A weaker constitutive view, that thinking requires only some degree
of conformity to logical rules, is held by Quine (1960), Davidson (1973, 1985)
and Stich (1990). In this paper, I’m going to work with a view on which a subject’s
representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests a disposition to conform
to logical rules. Call this ‘the dispositional-constitutive position’. Closely related
positions have been attributed to Reid (Rysiew 2002) and defended by Heal (1994,
1999) and Wedgwood (2017). However, the main line of argument from sections 2
to 4 will also apply to the other constitutive views. I should note that the view of
MacFarlane (2002) and Leech (2015) – that it is constitutive of thinking that it be
assessable by logical norms – is not a constitutive view in my sense: as MacFarlane
(2000, 54) makes clear, the view does not require any degree of conformity to logic.6
This paper does not aim to defend the dispositional-constitutive position. Rather,
the paper is about whether and how an account of the normativity of logic can
be built around logic’s constitutive role. This is a complex issue. One question is
whether the dispositional-constitutive position is on its own sufficient to account for
6Beyond this definitional point, there are good reasons not to think of the MacFarlane/Leech view as
giving logic a constitutive role. We can see this by asking what makes it the case that some activity X is
assessable by logical norms. Not everything is so assessable, after all: snow-shoveling is not. There are
three possibilities. First, that what makes X assessable by logical norms is that it conforms to them to
some degree. In this case, the MacFarlane/Leech view collapses into a properly constitutive one, but
assessability is no longer what is constitutive of thinking – partial conformity is. Second, that what
makes X assessable by logical norms is some non-logical feature. In this case, that non-logical feature
is what is properly constitutive of thinking; assessability by logic is derivative. The third possibility is
that it is a brute fact that X is assessable by logical norms. In this case, logic is properly constitutive of
thinking, but at the cost of implausibility. Surely there are many non-normative differences between
thinking and snow-shoveling that explain why the former is logically assessable and the latter is not. I
think the second interpretation is likely the right one, in which case logic has no properly constitutive
role on the MacFarlane/Leech view.
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logic’s normativity, or, more broadly, whether it plays any part in an account of logic’s
normativity. Another question is whether the dispositional-constitutive position is
even consistent with the normativity of logic.
A ‘no’ to the second question would, of course, entail a ‘no’ to the first. To start
with the second question, then: the reason why you might worry that the dispositional-
constitutive position is inconsistent with logical normativity is as follows. A standard
is normative for the members of a given class only if it is possible for there to be a
member of the class which fails to meet the standard.7 But if logic is constitutive of
thinking, then there can’t be thinking which fails to meet whatever standards logic
sets, so those standards cannot be normative for thinking.
Or, to put the worry another way, if logic is constitutive of thinking, then logic
doesn’t tell us how we ought to think but rather what it is to think. It doesn’t divide
good thinking from bad thinking – it divides thinking from non-thinking. And the
claim that logic divides good thinking from bad thinking (in a broad sense of ‘good’
and bad’) seems to be a mere notational variant of the claim that logic is normative for
thinking. So if logic is constitutive of thinking, then it is not normative for thinking.
However, this worry rests on misunderstanding the dispositional-constitutive
position. That position, as I’ve stated it, does not entail that any time a subject
violates a logical rule, the subject fails to think.8 What thinking requires is that the
subject tend to conform to logical rules; mistakes are possible as long as the subject
conforms to the requisite degree, where this conformity is explained by an underlying
disposition to conform.9 So there can be thinking which fails to meet the standards
logic sets. In other words, logic can both divide thinking from non-thinking and divide
good thinking from bad thinking. The constitutive role of logic is at least consistent
with logical normativity.
This leaves us with the first question: whether the dispositional-constitutive
position is on its own sufficient to account for logic’s normativity, or, more broadly,
whether it plays any part in an account of logic’s normativity. The aim of the paper is
to respond to this question. In other words, the paper is about how to get from the
dispositional-constitutive position to the conclusion that logic is normative.
7For detailed discussion see Lavin (2004). Leech has objected (2017, 366-7) that logical normativity
requires neither freedom of choice of how to think nor the possibility of failure to accord with logical
rules: ‘a perfectly rational being would still be right’. I agree that normativity does not require free
choice, but I do not think normativity can exist without some possibility for error. A perfectly rational
being would still be right, but only because there could exist imperfectly rational beings who could be
wrong (Nunez 2018, 1156 n. 10). Still, the strength of ‘possibility’ here is fairly weak: for a standard to
be normative for a given class it need only be conceptually possible for there to be a member of the
class which fails to meet the standard.
8In Lindeman’s terms (2017, 235-6), it is Threshold Constitutivism, not Naïve Constitutivism.
9Just how robust does the disposition have to be? I don’t think there is any precise answer to this
question. This fact reflects the vagueness of the concept thinking (Quine 1992, 59). While there is
a deep difference between thinking and failing to think, there is no sharp line along the spectrum of
logical dispositions where a subject goes from thinking to failing to think. On vagueness generally see
Keefe and Smith (1996).
4
My answer will be that while the dispositional-constitutive position is not on its
own sufficient to secure the normativity of logic, neither is it irrelevant to logic’s
normativity. Rather, the constitutive role of logic is essential to its normativity. The
main points of the account I will develop can be compactly stated as follows:
1. Logical rules are constitutive of thinking.
2. Thinking is necessary for human flourishing.
In my view, it is because logical rules are constitutive of a good that those rules are
normative.10
The paper goes as follows. In 2 I develop a natural line of thought about how to
develop the constitutive position into an account of logical normativity by drawing
on constitutivism in metaethics. In 3 I argue that, while this line of thought provides
some insights, it is importantly incomplete, as it is unable to explain why we should
think. I consider two attempts at rescuing the line of thought. The first, unsuccessful
response is that it is self-defeating to ask why we ought to think. The second response
is that we need to think. But this response secures normativity only if thinking has
some connection to human flourishing. In 4, drawing on neo-Aristotelian theories of
value, I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing. Logic is normative
because it is constitutive of this good. In 5 I show that the resulting account deals
nicely with problems that vex other accounts of logical normativity.
2 Logical self-constitution
In this section I sketch Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivist account of the normativity
of practical reason and then develop a parallel account of the normativity of logic.
2.1 The constitutivist account of practical reason
Korsgaard argues that the principles of practical reason are constitutive of action: they
are built in to what it is to act. This, she argues, is the source of their normativity.
Take, for example, the principle of instrumental reason: that if you intend some
end then you should intend the necessary means to the end. Korsgaard argues that
this principle is not imposed from outside on agents: rather, it is constitutive of acting.
For what distinguishes an action from a mere event is that an action is the result of
the agent’s intention, or ‘willing an end’. And ‘[t]o will an end just is to will to cause
or realize the end, hence to will to take the means to the end’ (2008, 56). Acting on
the principle of instrumental reason, then, is not one among various ways of acting; it
is what it is to act.
10The two-part structure of my account is distinctive. Some, like Korsgaard (2009) and Nunez (2018),
take the constitutive claim to be sufficient on its own for logical normativity. Others, like Wedgwood
(2017, 207-8), take the constitutive claim to be (albeit correct) irrelevant to logical normativity.
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You might worry that this means we can never will an end and fail to will the
means: if we fail to will the means, then we must not have willed the end in the
first place. It would follow that we can never violate the principle of instrumental
reason. But Korsgaard argues that this is a mistake. It fails to appreciate the first-
personal character of the principles of practical reason: they articulate what we
commit ourselves to in acting.11 Thus, ‘willing an end just is committing yourself
to realizing the end’ (2008, 57). As we can fall short of our commitments, we can
sometimes will an end without willing the means. We cannot fall short to an arbitrary
degree, however: at some point we are no longer acting at all.
Korsgaard gives similar arguments for more robust principles of practical reason,
such as the Categorical Imperative. The upshot of these arguments is that the principles
of practical reason are ‘internal’ or ‘constitutive’ standards: ‘standards that a thing
must meet in virtue of what it is’ (2008, 112). As long as what you are doing is
acting, your action is a good action insofar as it meets the internal standards of action.
Performing bad actions, therefore, ‘is not a different activity from performing good
ones. It is the same activity, badly done’ (2008, 113).
Korsgaard suggests that internal standards do not need the same kind of justifica-
tion as ‘external’ ones. If being habitable is part of the internal standard for a house,
then if you’re going to build a house, there is no room for the question why you ought
to build a habitable one. Similarly, if practical reason is the internal standard for
action, then if you’re going to act, there is no room for the question why you should
act in accordance with practical reason.
Of course, the question immediately arises: why should we ‘act’, in this sense?
Why should we ‘will’ an end, in the sense in which that requires willing the means,
rather than just following our desires? Korsgaard’s deepest answer to this question is
that acting is how we constitute ourselves as unified agents. We are confronted with
various sorts of temptations to act in different ways, and this is a sort of disunity. If I
simply follow the temptations, my conduct can be attributed to those temptations, but
not to me as a whole person. By conforming to the requirements of practical reason, I
unify myself in the face of this play of temptations. ‘For to will an end is not just to
cause it, or even to allow an impulse in me to operate as its cause, but, so to speak, to
consciously pick up the reins, and make myself the cause of the end.’ If I never will
an end, ‘this means that I, considered as an agent, do not exist’ (2008, 59-60).
2.2 The constitutivist account of logical normativity
Korsgaard suggests (2009, 67) that a parallel account can be given of the normativity
of logic. The basic idea must be that logical rules are constitutive of thinking, just
as principles of practical reason are constitutive of acting. In this section I sketch
11There’s a difficult question about how Korsgaard’s notion of commitment is related to the notion of a
disposition. I don’t want to claim that commitments are merely dispositions in disguise, but Korsgaard’s
view that there is a limit on how far we can fall short of our commitments while still having them brings
the two notions close together. For further discussion of commitments, see Bilgrami (2012).
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such an account. It will be helpful to begin with a line of thought that supports the
constitutive position before developing an account of logical normativity.
Let’s start with with the claim that having a thought requires a ‘setting’ (Heal
1994; Stroud 1979). It doesn’t make sense to suppose that someone could think a
single thought as the entirety of their mental life. Nor does it make sense to suppose
that someone could think a thought while being wholly insensitive to its relations
to other thoughts. Having any thought requires grasping some of these connections:
seeing the ways that other thoughts support it, or follow from it, or stand in tension
with it. (It doesn’t follow that, as inferentialists claim, there are ‘canonical’ relations
the acceptance of which is a necessary condition on understanding.12)
Now, it is impossible to grasp these connections between thoughts without being
disposed to conform to some logical rules. These rules govern the connections between
thoughts which make understanding possible.13 Some examples will help to make this
clear, although I should emphasize that the general thesis can survive even if particular
instances turn out to be problematic. First, it seems that it would be impossible to
grasp that one thought supports another without being disposed to follow Modus
Ponens, which says, in intuitive terms, to believe q if you believe p and you take it
that p supports q (Hale 2002; Russell 1912, ch. VII). Or again, it seems that it would
be impossible to grasp that two thoughts are in tension without some aversion to
believing contradictions – in other words, without a disposition not to believe p and
not-p. Without some tendency to reason in these ways, it would be meaningless to
take two thoughts to stand in relations of support or tension.
It follows that thinking requires dispositions to conform to some logical rules;
in this sense, logical rules are constitutive of thinking.14 Now, it can’t be the case
that such dispositions preclude ever making a mistaken inference, or mistakenly
rejecting a valid one. Rather, the dispositions will manifest in a tendency to conform
to the rule, except where the disposition is overridden by other factors – for instance,
inattention, tiredness or the complexity of the thoughts under consideration. But
12For inferentialism, see Brandom (1994) and Boghossian (2003, 2012). Because it is not committed
to inferentialism, the line of thought developed in this section can avoid some of the counterexamples
presented by Burge (1986) and Williamson (2006, 2007); see also Wikforss (2009).
13As has been observed in connection with Quine’s epistemology: see Quine (1951), Dummett (1973,
597), Priest (1979), Wright (1986) and BonJour (1998, 95).
14The existence of such dispositions might seem doubtful, given evidence that people tend to reason
incorrectly in some situations (Wason 1968). In response, I would make two points. First, while the
existence of these dispositions is an empirical question, the way this evidence bears on them is not
straightforward. For example, in the Wason selection task it is unclear whether test subjects are engaged
in conditional reasoning at all (Sperber et al. 1995, s. 2). Second, the dispositions posited by the
constitutivist are general, and can fail to manifest in particular cases, as long as there is an explanation
for the failure. There may also be further, independently motivated conditions that the dispositions have
to satisfy: they may need to be shared or socially enforced (Kripke 1982; Brandom 1994, ch. 1), or
it may be that the subject who has the disposition needs to be able to recognize and correct mistakes.
A full specification would also have to address the possibility of finks, maskers and mimickers (Lewis
1997; Choi and Fara 2018). We do not need to settle these questions here; for present purposes it is
enough if the dispositions rule out the possibility of wholly illogical thought.
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while the dispositions need not manifest in every case, they must exist if the subject
is thinking at all.
In this way, the constitutivist will argue, logical rules are standards that thinking
must meet in virtue of what it is – internal standards for thinking. If you’re going
to think, then there is no room for the further question of why you ought to think
logically.
As before, however, the natural question is why we should think in the first place.
The parallel with willing an end suggests the following response: in thinking, we con-
stitute ourselves as unified subjects. We are confronted with a variety of impressions
– temptations to take reality to be one way or another. This is a sort of disunity. If we
passively followed these impressions, we might have various representations, but we
would not be subjects – the loci of points of view on reality.15 To be subjects, we have
to actively commit ourselves to reality’s being one way or another; we have to ‘make
up our minds’ (Valaris 2017).16
Let’s call this the ‘constitutivist account of logical normativity’.
3 A problem for constitutivism and two unsuccessful
responses
The constitutivist account of logical normativity faces an immediate problem: it does
not tell us why we ought to think. In this section I develop the problem and then
consider two unsuccessful responses to it. The first response is a dialectical one,
suggesting that the problem undermines itself, and the second response appeals to
an innate need to think. I argue that both attempts are unsuccessful, but the second
one points the way to a better approach.
3.1 The absence of value problem
We can see the problem by considering an objection made by David Enoch against
constitutivist accounts of practical reason. In the words of Enoch’s skeptic:
Perhaps I cannot be classified as an agent without aiming to constitute
myself. But why should I be an agent? Perhaps I can’t act without aiming
at self-constitution, but why should I act? If your reasoning works, this
15Compare Lewis’s (1982) suggestion that we tolerate inconsistencies by fragmenting our total body
of beliefs.
16I do not mean to suggest that perfect unity is possible for beings like us. One reason for this comes
from cases like the Preface Paradox (Christensen 2004), where you believe p, q, r . . . and also that,
since you are fallible, at least one of your beliefs p, q, r . . . is false: an inconsistent set of beliefs. The
unavoidability of such cases for a rational and fallible subject (Harman 1986, 109) might make them
less bad, but they remain a source of disunity. Of course, the Preface Paradox doesn’t arise in a picture
that uses degrees of belief only, but even in a degree picture there is little reason to think that any of us
could achieve a totally coherent body of beliefs.
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just shows that I don’t care about agency and action. I am perfectly happy
being a shmagent – a nonagent who is very similar to agents but who lacks
the aim (constitutive of agency but not of shmagency) of self-constitution.
I am perfectly happy performing shmactions – nonaction events that are
very similar to actions but that lack the aim (constitutive of actions but
not of shmactions) of self-constitution. (Enoch 2006, 179)
This is what we might call, following Shamik Dasgupta (2018), an ‘absence of value’
problem. It may be that a certain concept – being unified, being an agent – will not
apply to you unless you meet certain standards. But this fact is, for all that has been
said so far, ‘normatively inert’ (Dasgupta 2018, 310). Why does it matter whether
you are an agent?
Precisely the same problem will apply to the constitutivist account of logical
normativity. Suppose it is true that your representational activity will not merit the
title of ‘thinking’ unless it tends to conform to logical rules. Why does it matter
whether your activity merits this title? Perhaps if you fail to think, you fail to be a
subject – but why does it matter to be a subject?
While Enoch puts the problem in the mouth of a skeptic, there is nothing particu-
larly skeptical about it. The problem is better seen as a failure to explain where the
normativity comes in. It may be that someone who does not think is not a subject at
all, but this is consistent with there being nothing normatively significant about being
a subject. More needs to be said in order to explain why failing to be a subject is a
normatively significant failure.
We can see what is missing if we look at the problem from a different angle. Enoch
rather dismissively refers to the failure to meet an internal standard as a failure to be
‘classified’ in a certain way.17 The point of his rhetoric is, I think, this: for any concept
K which has an internal standard of the sort we have been discussing, there is, of
course, another concept J with a different internal standard, such that something
which fails to be a K may still be a J; indeed, there will even be a concept K*, such
that something falls under K* if and only if it fails to meet the internal standard for K.
For example, you count as ‘nonthinking’ if and only if you fall below the threshold for
thinking. So, for the constitutivist to show that some standard is normative, it is not
enough to identify some concept to which that standard is internal. The constitutivist
has to show that this concept is distinguished; they have to give a reason why it
matters to be thinking rather than nonthinking.
It seems to me, however, that, when we look at the problem this way, things are
not as hopeless for the constitutivist as Enoch supposes. Is there really nothing we
can say about why it matters to be thinking rather than nonthinking?
17Cf. Railton’s worry (1997, 309) that constitutive arguments are ‘merely linguistic’.
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3.2 The dialectical response
Here is a first response to the problem. Someone who raises the objection discussed in
the previous section is asking why they ought to think. In asking this question, however,
the objector is inviting the constitutivist to give an argument in response. And in
inviting argument, the objector is already committed to the practice of accepting claims
on the basis of argument – i.e. to inference. So the objector is already committed to
thinking rather than nonthinking.18
Why does the objector have to be committed in this way? Well, if they are not so
committed, then it is wrong to describe them as making an ‘objection’, because this
presupposes a commitment to thinking rather than nonthinking. And if they have not
made an objection, then the constitutivist has nothing to worry about. Call this the
‘dialectical response’.
I don’t think we should be satisfied with this response. It depends on framing the
absence of value problem as an objection pressed by an objector. This is what opens
the door to arguing that the objector’s position is self-undermining. But we are not
obliged to frame the problem in this way.
The constitutivist account was supposed to explain why logic is normative. In
terms introduced by Dummett (1974), this is an ‘explanatory’ project rather than a
‘suasive’ one: the aim is not to persuade someone who denies that logic is normative
that it is, but rather to explain to someone who accepts that logic is normative why it
is.19 The absence of value problem suggests that the constitutivist has not fulfilled
this explanatory task until they have shown why the concept of which logical rules
are constitutive – the concept of thinking – is normatively significant. The problem,
then, need not be framed as an objection pressed by an objector: we can see it more
simply as a gap in the constitutivist’s own account.
3.3 The need to think
The second response to the absence of value problem is to argue that we simply
have to engage in the activity of which the relevant rules are constitutive. Some of
Korsgaard’s remarks suggest this approach (2009, 32): ‘the laws of practical reason
govern our actions because if we don’t follow them we just aren’t acting, and acting
is something that we must do.’ Similarly, the response to the question ‘why should I
think?’ may be that you have to.
This claim can be understood in a couple of different ways. One reading would
be that it is simply impossible not to think (i.e. there is no possible world where
you are not thinking). But this is not the reading we should adopt. First, it seems
straightforwardly false, since there are times when we are not thinking – for example,
18For a similar argument in the context of agency, see Silverstein (2015).
19Note that some moral constitutivists take their project to be a suasive one, with the aim of refuting
a moral skeptic. I am assuming that this is the wrong approach when it comes to logic.
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in deep sleep. Second, it is inconsistent with the claim that sometimes we fail to think
in virtue of falling too far from the constitutive rules of thinking.
On a different reading, the idea is that the aim of thinking is inescapable. While
we we don’t always succeed in thinking, we are always driven to do so. This reading
seems more promising. To fill it out further, I’m going to appropriate some work by
Imogen Dickie on the mind’s ‘need to represent things outside itself ’.20
Dickie characterizes a ‘need’ as a ‘personal-level goal-representing state’ (2015,
280) which, ‘like an intention, can guide action, but which, unlike an intention, does
not have propositional content’ (100). To be a goal-representing state is, roughly,
to represent some target and to guide us towards that target. Needs thus stand
to intentions as perceptions (on non-conceptualist views) stand to beliefs.21 Dickie
proposes, then, that the mind has a need to represent things outside itself. The target
of the need is representing; the need guides us towards that target, motivating us to
represent when we are not already doing so.
We can appropriate this account to respond to the absence of value problem on
behalf of the constitutivist about logical normativity. The answer to the question why
we should think is that we need to. What distinguishes the concept of thinking from
the concept of nonthinking is that only the concept of thinking picks out the target of
our need. As Dickie argues, if you have a need for x, and the need motivates you to
take certain steps to attain x, and those steps reliably lead to attaining x, then those
steps are ‘strongly justified’. For example, if your need to eat leads you to take steps
which reliably lead to eating, those steps are strongly (albeit not absolutely) justified.
So, having proposed that we have a need to think, the constitutivist can argue that,
since following logical rules is not only a reliable means to thinking but constitutive
of it, following those rules is strongly justified. That following logical rules has some
positive justificatory status, which not following those rules lacks, seems like enough
to address the absence of value problem.
I agree that needs can play this justificatory role. But Dickie’s characterization of
what it is to be a need is incomplete. Dickie characterizes a need as a non-conceptual
motivational state, but that is not a sufficient condition: a need also has to be a state
whose fulfillment is good for the subject who has the need. We can put this point
more carefully by drawing on Wiggins’ analysis of needs. For Wiggins, I have a need
for x (if and) only if ‘it is necessary, things being as they actually are, that if I avoid
being harmed then I have x’ (1997, 10. Being ‘harmed’ means falling below ‘some
however minimal level of flourishing that is actually attainable’ (13, italics omitted).
We have a need to eat not only because we have a non-conceptual motivation to eat,
but because there is some minimal level of flourishing we cannot attain if we do not
eat.
20I say ‘appropriate’ because Dickie’s account involves a very different set of issues and commitments
to those discussed here.
21So we can have a need for x without having the concept of x. For this idea of non-conceptual content,
see Peacocke (1992, ch.3).
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To fix ideas, let us say that a non-conceptual motivational state is a ‘drive’. Where
a drive’s fulfillment is necessary for some minimal level of flourishing, the drive is a
‘need’; otherwise, it is a ‘mere drive’. Now, the relation between needs (in the proper
sense) and flourishing is essential to the justificatory role that needs can play.22 Mere
drives do no justificatory work. Consider, for example, someone who has a drive to
do nothing but chop onions all day long. This state may reliably generate its own
fulfillment, but all that chopping is not thereby justified. The reason is that the
chopping is not necessary for the flourishing of the person with the drive.
So suppose that the constitutivist proposes that we have a non-conceptual motiva-
tional state whose target is thinking. The constitutivist must then clarify whether this
state is a need or a mere drive. If it is a mere drive, then it cannot solve the absence of
value problem. The fact that we are driven to think is just like the fact that someone
is driven to chop onions all day: it is normatively inert.
It seems, then, that the constitutivist should claim that thinking is a need: that
it is necessary for some level of human flourishing. In fact, I think this is the right
way to go, and I will develop this suggestion in the next section. But it’s worth noting
that if thinking is a good for us, then this is why the constitutive rules of thinking
are normative. The feature of needs which does the justificatory work is not that
they have motivational force but that their fulfillment is good for the subject who has
them.
4 The value of thinking
Let’s take stock. We were attempting to build an account of the normativity of logic
around the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking. The initial proposal was that
logical rules are internal standards for thinking, and that thinking is how we unify
ourselves as subjects. The problem was that there are many different concepts with
their own internal standards, such that it was unclear why it mattered if we fell short
of the standards for the concept of thinking in particular: why should we think? The
first response was that it is incoherent to ask why we should think, because asking
why already shows a commitment to thinking. The second response was that we
need to think. I argued that the first response failed, while the second response could
succeed only if thinking were necessary for human flourishing – more broadly, only if
thinking had some value.
In this section, after briefly considering a range of claims we might make about the
value of thinking, I’ll argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing.23 Before
22To be clear, I think that the ‘need to represent’ is a need in the proper sense. But the consideration
Dickie cites in support of the need’s existence – its ability to explain our representational behaviour
(2015, 127) – show only that it is a drive. Showing that it is a need would require more normative
considerations.
23For a different attempt to bring together constitutivism with neo-Aristotelianism, see Hacker-Wright
(2012). See also Thompson (Thompson) and Lott (2014).
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I start, however, let me comment on the shape of the account and how it relates to
constitutivism about normativity. One attraction of constitutivism is the prospect of
grounding normativity in the thinner notion of satisfying the internal standard of a
concept. Relatedly, constitutivism offers the prospect of an account of normativity
which a skeptic can only reject at the cost of literal inconsistency. By supplementing
the constitutivist account with a claim about the value of thinking, we abandon both
of these prospects. Why, then, should a constitutivist be interested?
At least in the logical case, I don’t think these prospects are what is most compelling
about constitutivism. What I’m after is an explanation of logical normativity, and
what I find compelling in constitutivism is the idea that logic tells us what it is to
think: that if we don’t even tend to conform to logical rules, we are not thinking at all.
This, it seems to me, is an idea we have independent reason to accept. The interest of
the account I will develop is that it makes this idea central to (though not exhaustive
of) an explanation of logical normativity.
4.1 Possible views of the value of thinking
Once we are willing to supplement the constitutivist account with a claim about the
value of thinking, a range of options opens up. Different claims about the value of
thinking lead to different views of the normativity of logic. In this section I briefly
survey the options, from the most minimal to the more robust, before discussing my
preferred option.
1. Thinking is instrumentally valuable as a means to some particular end, which
some people have and others do not. On this view, logic would be normative,
but only for those who shared this end, and only instrumentally.
2. Thinking is instrumentally valuable as a means to some particular end which
everyone has. On this view, logic would be normative for everyone, but only
instrumentally. This gives logic its universality, but – as Hilary Kornblith has
noted – such a strategy incurs a ‘substantial burden of proof ’:
any attempt to gain universal applicability by appeal to goals that
all humans in fact have will almost certainly run afoul of the facts.
Human beings are a very diverse lot; some of us are quite strange. It
is hard to imagine making a plausible case for any particular goal or
activity which is genuinely universally valued. (Kornblith 1993, 367;
cf. Foot 2001, 44.)
3. Thinking is instrumentally valuable as a means to every end, so that if you have
any ends at all, you need to think. This is because thinking is necessary for
deciding how best to pursue your ends. Kornblith suggests a similar view of
epistemic norms, noting that on such a view, ‘they are derived from our desires
in a way which removes any mystery surrounding them’, but are ‘universal in
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their applicability and not merely contingent upon having certain values’ (1993,
372).
4. Thinking is valuable for its own sake.24 However, this is consistent with the
possibility of human flourishing without thinking: in other words, thinking may
be valuable for its own sake but not be something we need to do.
5. Thinking is valuable for its own sake because it is necessary for human flourish-
ing. In other words, thinking is something we need to do.25
Option 1 is implausibly weak: it gives logical rules the same normative force as the
rules of chess. Options 2, 3 and 4 are less weak, and I think they are live possibilities.
However, I am going to develop Option 5. It seems plausible to me that thinking is
as strongly related to human flourishing as this claim says; moreover, I don’t think
there is any special reason to prefer theoretical austerity from the outset. But I should
stress that what comes next is one way of developing the constitutivist position, not
the only way.
Let me briefly comment on the way that Option 5 explains the normativity of
logic. If we accept Option 5 together with the dispositional-constitutive position, we
have the following two claims:
1. Logical rules are constitutive of thinking.
2. Thinking is necessary for human flourishing.
In order to arrive at the conclusion that logic is normative, we need the following
principle: if X is constitutive of Y, and Y is necessary for human flourishing, then X is
normative.
By way of brief motivation for this principle, consider G.E.M. Anscombe’s accounts
of the authority of the law (1978) and the morality of promising (1969), both of
which use a strategy parallel to the one I propose for logic. In both cases, there is
something constituted by a rule: the existence of a legal order is constituted by the
rule ‘obey the law’; the institution of promising is constituted by the rule ‘keep your
promises’. And in both cases, the thing in question is necessary for human flourishing:
the existence of a legal order ensures some degree of security from arbitrary violence;
the institution of promising underwrites human cooperation. As Anscombe puts it,
these things have the kind of necessity Aristotle defined as ‘that without which some
good will not be obtained’.26 This, Anscombe suggests, is why the rules in question
are normative.
24As several philosophers have argued, this is not the same as ‘intrinsic’ value: something can be
valuable for its own sake in virtue of its intrinsic properties, or in virtue of its relational properties
(Korsgaard 1983; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000).
25Compare Moore (2003, 128) and Schechter and Enoch (2006, 707).
26Aristotle,Metaphysics V 1015a20. The same definition underlies Wiggins’ account of needs, discussed
above.
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The principle that if X is constitutive of Y, and Y is necessary for human flourishing,
then X is normative simply makes explicit Anscombe’s explanatory strategy. If that
strategy is a plausible one, then so is the principle.
4.2 Thinking and human flourishing
In this section I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing (Option 5 of the
previous section). I don’t have a proof of this claim, but will offer four considerations
which support it. Following this, I address the absence of value problem.
First, as I noted above, Dickie argues (2015, 127) that the need to represent
explains why we form beliefs in some situations but not others:
If you have plenty to think about, you are not hungry for food for thought,
and are less likely to take up the opportunity to think about a thing that an
attentional perceptual link provides. If you are hungry for food for thought,
you will seize upon the opportunity provided by an attentional perceptual
feed, sustaining the attentional link, and forming and maintaining a body
of 〈That isΦ〉 beliefs even if the object you are attending to is an unexciting
specimen with which you would not bother in a situation where the need
was being fulfilled in other ways.
I suggested that these considerations only support the existence of a drive – not a
need in the proper sense. But now it is worth noting that the drive to think does not
seem pathological in the way that a drive to chop onions all day does. So there is at
least prima facie reason to take this to be a need in the proper sense.
Second, for most other human activities, it seems possible to imagine a scenario
in which someone has a flourishing life without the activity. For example, eating is
typical of human beings, but we can imagine someone who goes on a fast, perhaps
even to their death, for some worthwhile end. And while prior eating might be a
necessary condition for fasting, eating plays no role in justifying the fast. But thinking
is different. The only way I can imagine someone having a flourishing life without
thinking would be if they had intentionally renounced it – perhaps as a religious act.27
And this just means that the person’s nonthinking is only justified if it is itself the
result of – that is, justified by – thinking. So some thinking remains necessary.
It’s worth emphasizing, too, just how deeply a life without thinking would differ
from our own. As suggested in Option 3 in the previous section, thinking is necessary
for deciding how best to pursue your ends. So it’s not clear that someone who had
renounced thinking could exercise agency. And it seems doubtful that we should
count as flourishing a life that involved no exercise of agency.
27A referee suggests that someone might renounce thinking as the result of a non-conceptual experi-
ence, such as an epiphany or revelation. If this were possible, it would weaken the force of the present
consideration, perhaps motivating a retreat to a weaker claim (Option 1, 2, 3 or 4). But I think the
possibility is somewhat tenuous: it might be more fitting to say, in such a case, that the person is not
flourishing.
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Third, we might consider the capacities that are typical of human beings. One
capacity that does seem typical is the capacity for rational activity. As Philippa Foot
writes (2001, 56),
there is this great difference between human beings and even the most
intelligent of animals. Human beings not only have the power to reason
about all sorts of things in a speculative way, but also the power to see
grounds for acting in one way rather than another; and if told that they
should do one thing rather than another, they can ask why they should.
A more traditional way to put this point is to say that human beings are rational
animals, or thinking animals. Now, in the classical neo-Aristotelian framework, a
member of a given life-form cannot flourish without doing the things that are typical
for members of that life-form (Foot 2001, ch. 2).28 So if thinking is typical for the
human life-form, then thinking is necessary for human flourishing.
Similar ideas are implicit in some constitutivist writing. Tyke Nunez (2018),
for example, argues that logic is normative because logical rules specify the proper
exercise of our capacities: ‘every exercise of the faculty ought to accord with its laws’
(2018, 1162). On its own, Nunez’ claim is not enough to secure normativity, as we
can ask why we ought to exercise our capacities properly rather than improperly.
Nunez’ claim needs to be supplemented with the claim that the capacity to think
is characteristic of human beings, such that the proper exercise of this capacity is
necessary for human flourishing.
Fourth, recall what I referred to as Korsgaard’s ‘deepest answer’ to the question
of why we should act: that acting is how we constitute ourselves as unified agents.
Along similar lines, I suggested that thinking is how we constitute ourselves as unified
subjects. On their own, I argued, these ideas fail to secure normativity. But now we
can see these ideas in a different, more Aristotelian light. We are living things of a
particular sort – human beings. As living things, we are organized in a teleological
way: we need to maintain our unity in the face of a tendency to disunity (Tenenbaum
2011; Moosavi 2019). As a general rule, then, a necessary condition for a living thing
to flourish is that it maintain its unity.
But different sorts of living things are unified in different ways. Every animal
is unified by maintaining the distinctness of its body from its surroundings. But
as human beings, we are unified in a further, particularly self-conscious way – as
agents and, more importantly for present purposes, as subjects. Given that thinking
is how human beings constitute ourselves as unified subjects, and that such unity is a
necessary condition for a living thing to flourish, it follows that thinking is necessary
for human flourishing.
28We might worry about the consequences of this Aristotelian claim for human beings who are, in
various ways, unable to do what is ‘typical for the life-form’. In my view, the right response to this worry
is to place less emphasis on the human essence and more emphasis on the idea that flourishing consists
in the full exercise of the capacities which one actually has. (Compare Wiggins’ emphasis on the degree
of flourishing that is ‘actually attainable’.)
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Finally, let me tie this back to the absence of value problem. One way of looking at
that problem is that, even if there is a concept K to which some standard is internal,
it’s not clear why it matters to be a K rather than something else. In other words, the
constitutivist has to show that the concept they care about is distinguished in some
normatively significant way. We’re now in a position to address this problem. What
distinguishes thinking from nonthinking is the role that thinking plays in the life of
human beings. It is simply part of being a human being that thinking is necessary for
your flourishing.
Of course, you might ask: why does it matter to be a human being, rather than a
human being*, where the latter is like a human being, but without a need to think?
Perhaps a human being* has a need to engage in some different representational
activity, thinking*, which is somewhat like thinking, but not constituted by logical
rules. Moreover, perhaps thinking* is better than thinking, so that we might be better
off trying to be human beings* rather than human beings.
We should go slowly here. First, it’s not clear what it would mean for thinking* to
be better than thinking. Better how? To make sense of this claim, we would need
some idea of a standard, applicable to both thinking and thinking*, which thinking*
comes closer to meeting than thinking. And it is at least difficult to see what that
standard would be.29 (Consider the parallel question of whether thinking is better
than perceiving.)
Second, it’s not clear how to understand the idea that we might be better off trying
to be human beings* rather than human beings. In particular, it’s hard to distinguish
this from the question whether it would be better if human beings were replaced by
human beings*.30 For it’s not clear in what sense the resultant beings would be us.
The right response to the absence of value problem, then, is that there are limits
on our ability to live by alternative concepts: it is not the case that for any concept
K, we can invent a concept K* which is an intelligible alternative for beings like us.
There are some concepts – we might think of them as ‘bedrock concepts’ (Chalmers
2011, s.8) – for which we have no alternatives. I have suggested that the concept of
thinking and the concept of a human being are bedrock in this sense. We are human
beings, with a need to think: these facts are not up to us.
For these reasons, we should accept that thinking is necessary for human flourish-
ing. Supposing that logic is constitutive of thinking, it follows that logic is normative.
5 Vexing issues about logical normativity
That concludes themain part of my case for the proposed account of logical normativity.
In this section, I argue that this account deals nicely with some vexing issues that arise
29Indeed, it is unclear what thinking* is supposed to be. For thinking is not just a name for repre-
sentational activity which meets certain constraints: it is representational activity whose contents are
thoughts. So we can ask what kind of content thinking* is supposed to have, if not thoughts.
30For discussion of this question, see Williams (2006) and Moore (2018, ch. 17).
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in the literature on logical normativity. This will help to clarify the kind of normativity
that logic has in my account and the role of this normativity in an explanation of how
logic relates to thinking.
The issues I have in mind are about various implausible consequences that follow
from certain formulations of the claim that logical rules are normative. For example,
consider the Simple Formulation:
Simple Formulation If p entails q, then if you believe p, you ought to believe q.31
This has a welter of implausible consequences: first, it seems to entail that if you
believe p, you ought to believe if p, then p, and then you ought to believe if p, then, if
p, then p and so on. This seems a waste of cognitive resources Harman (1986, 12).32
Second, it seems to entail that if you believe p and if p, then q, then you ought to
believe q – even if q is false (Harman 1984; MacFarlane 2004).33 And surely we
ought not to believe things that are false. Third, given that p entails p, and there is
nothing in the Simple Formulation to exclude the case where q = p, it seems to entail
that if you believe p, you ought to believe p. This seems like an objectionable kind of
bootstrapping: believing something doesn’t on its own give you a reason to believe it
Broome (1999).
Now, the claim that logical rules are normative need not be committed to the
Simple Formulation. But the underlying concern is that any formulation of the claim
that logical rules are normative will entail similar consequences, or else be too weak
to be interesting. Defenders of the normativity of logic have tended to respond by
developing ‘bridge principles’, weakenings of the Simple Formulation that avoid the
implausible consequences. Here, I begin with some general comments on how these
issues appear in my account. Next, I respond to each of the implausible consequences
mentioned above. Finally, I compare my treatment of these issues with recent accounts
centred on bridge principles, showing that, in my account, while a bridge principle
holds, it is not fundamental in explaining the relation of logic to thinking.
5.1 Three questions about logical rules
To begin the response, we need to distinguish three questions about logical rules
and their corresponding answers. The first question is: what are the logical rules
31A fully general formulation of this thesis would have to make provision for multiple-premise
entailments. However, this detail doesn’t matter for our purposes, as the problems arise even in the
single-premise case. Also, if we conceived of believing in terms of degrees of confidence, we would need
to reformulate the thesis to impose a constraint on the degrees of belief in p and q: for discussion, see
Field (2009) and Milne (2009).
32In fact, depending on what a belief is, the ‘cluttering’ beliefs might not count as additional beliefs.
(For example, they don’t narrow the set of possible worlds in which the subject’s beliefs are true.) But
for purposes of argument I will waive this point. Harman (1986, 14) responds to a related point by
specifying that the objection applies to explicit rather than implicit beliefs.
33Parallel arguments are often given against the claim that meaning is normative: see Hattiangadi
(2006) and Glüer and Wikforss (2009).
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constitutive of thinking? For present purposes, I will take Conditional Proof and
Modus Ponens to be logical rules constitutive of thinking.34 I formulate them as
follows:
Conditional Proof If by assuming p you can deduce q, infer if p, then q.
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, infer q.
All rules define a standard of correctness, specifying some acts as correct in light of
the rule (Broome 2014, 24). It would be equivalent, then, to formulate the rules as
follows:
Conditional Proof If by assuming p you can deduce q, it is correct to infer if p, then
q.
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, it is correct to infer q.
As I mentioned earlier in the paper, the choice of how to present logical rules is a
notational one; it doesn’t yet answer any philosophical question about the normative
force of the rules.
The second question is: what relation must a subject have to the rule in order to
think? So far, I’ve said simply that a subject must have a disposition to conform to
the rule, a disposition which is manifested in a subject’s tendency to conform to the
rule. But now I need to say a bit more about what this amounts to. Claims about
dispositions play an explanatory role: when X has a disposition to do Y, and then X
does Y, we can explain why X did Y by appeal to its disposition. But where the bearer
of the disposition is a subject, we also have to say what it is first-personally for the
subject to have, and to exercise, the disposition.
Borrowing from Peacocke (1987), I am going to say that when a subject has a
disposition to conform to some logical rule, the subject finds the transitions that the
rule specifies as correct ‘primitively compelling’.35 That is, they are compelling, and
the subject need not have any further idea of why they are compelling. To be clear,
this means that the subject is tempted by particular inferences which evidently fall
under the rule. It does not mean that the subject is tempted to accept a general
representation of the rule.36 The subject can act on the resulting compulsion by
making the transition, but there is no guarantee that they will do so: the question
may never arise, or the compulsion may be overridden by competing factors. These
factors might include inattention, tiredness, the complexity of the thoughts involved
(making it unobvious that the transition falls under the rule) or other reasons not to
34I am not assuming that these are the only rules with this status.
35Harman discusses a related notion of ‘psychological immediacy’ in Appendix A of his (1986).
36Most people would find it hard to resist the following reasoning: Either I left my keys at home or
in the car. They’re not in the car. So they must be at home. But they need not find a representation of
Disjunction Elimination intuitive.
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make the transition.37 Unless the subject finds the transitions compelling, however,
they are not thinking.
The third question is: why ought we to think? And here my claim is that thinking
is necessary for human flourishing. By contrast, there are other rules such that we
must have a similar relation to them in order to do a certain activity, but there is no
general reason why we ought to do that activity. For example, we must have a similar
relation to the rules of chess in order to count as playing chess, but there is no general
reason why we ought to play chess.
Now, I think that full answers to these three questions would be an exhaustive
account of the sense in which Conditional Proof and Modus Ponens are normative. But
at no point in answering these questions are we committed to the Simple Formulation.
The Simple Formulation is neither an answer to the first question (what the logical
rules are), nor to the second question (how a subject must relate to logical rules in
order to think), nor to the third (why the subject ought to think). Nor does it follow
from the answers to these questions taken jointly.
5.2 The implausible consequences of the Simple Formulation
Let me now consider the implausible consequences that follow from the Simple
Formulation. The first was that if you believe p, you ought to believe if p, then p and
so on. The second was that if you believe p and if p, then q, then you ought to believe
q – even if q is false. The third was that if you believe p, you ought to believe p. Let
me start with the first two cases, as the third raises some additional issues.
Here is what I want to say about the inferences in the first two cases. First, both
inferences are correct in light of logical rules which we are supposing to be constitutive
of thinking: the first in light of Conditional Proof, the second in light of Modus Ponens.
Second, this means that anyone who thinks has a disposition to conform to these
rules. As I suggested above, this means that anyone who thinks finds the transitions
that the rules specify as correct primitively compelling. But it does not follow that
anyone who thinks must draw these inferences: the question may never arise, or the
compulsion may be overridden by competing factors. In the case of the move from p
to if p, then p, it seems plausible that the question will never arise. In the case of the
move from p and if p, then q to q, where q is false, the fact that q is false is a competing
factor that can, and should, override the compulsion to draw the inference.38
Third, however, if the subject does not have the disposition to conform to these
rules – i.e. if the question does arise, and there are no competing considerations, but
37There is a helpful discussion of the various possibilities here in Moore (2003, 48-49).
38An alternative solution to this problem is to weaken our characterization of the dispositions required
for grasping logical rules. Rather than dispositions to infer a conclusion on the basis of judging the
premises, Murzi and Steinberger (2013) propose dispositions to consider a conclusion on the basis of
entertaining or supposing the premises. I am sympathetic to this solution, but accepting it would require
discussion of the role of entertaining and suppositional reasoning in thinking, which I have no room to
do here.
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the subject does not find the transitions compelling – then the subject is not thinking.
Consider a parallel case. Suppose that you believe x is an F G (for example, ‘This
is a tall tree’). This entails – not logically, but bracket this for now – x is a G (‘This is
a tree’). By analogy with the Simple Formulation, it might be proposed that if you
believe x is an F G, you ought to believe x is a G. The same problems will arise: first,
that this is a waste of cognitive resources, and second, what if x is a G is false?
Here is what I would say instead. First, the inference from x is an F G to x is
a G is correct in light of the rule for thoughts of this structure.39 Second, anyone
who understands x is an F G must have a disposition to conform to this rule; they
must find the transition to x is a G primitively compelling. However, this does not
mean they must draw this inference: the question may never arise, or the compulsion
may be overridden. But, third, if they do not have this disposition at all, then they
simply do not understand x is an F G. The fact that x is a G is false is a good reason to
override the disposition, but it is not a good reason for denying the existence of the
disposition altogether. (The parallel is only partial because the rule in question is not
a logical one: you can fail to understand the relevant structure in x is an F G while
still thinking. In general, this is the difference between the normativity of logic and
the normativity, if there is any, of non-logical elements of content.)
Finally, the third implausible consequence of the Simple Formulation was that if
you believe p, you ought to believe p. This raises somewhat different issues from the
previous two cases because it doesn’t depend on the rules for any logical connective.
Rather, it depends only on Reflexivity, which is a structural rule – that is, an inference
rule that is not about any logical connective.
Reflexivity From p, infer p.
This rule guarantees that p entails p, and then the Simple Formulation tells us that if
you believe p, you ought to believe p.
In the discussion so far, I’ve implicitly taken ‘logical rules’ to refer only to opera-
tional rules – rules for logical connectives – and haven’t said anything about the role
of structural rules, or how thinkers must relate to such rules. Structural rules may
raise different issues. While it seems plausible that we have dispositions to infer in
accordance with Conditional Proof and Modus Ponens, it’s less clear what it would
mean to have a disposition to infer in accordance with, say, Transitivity. On the other
hand, it’s hard to draw a clear distinction between operational and structural rules,
as operational rules can be seen as reflecting structural rules (Došen 1989), and
operational rules can be seen as containing information about structural rules (Dicher
2016). These facts favour a uniform treatment of operational and structural rules.
39For discussion of such ‘structurally valid’ inferences, see Evans (1976) and Balcerak Jackson (2007).
To give a full account of these inferences we would need to distinguish bad cases like ‘x is a rubber duck,
so x is a duck’. I’m going to assume that there is some way of distinguishing these cases, as it seems
plausible that in good cases the inference in question is closely tied to understanding (Balcerak Jackson
2009).
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Without taking a conclusive position on how other structural rules should be
treated, it does seem plausible to me that any thinker has to have a disposition to
conform to Reflexivity. If you judge p but do not find it primitively compelling to judge
p, then there is reason to doubt that you are judging at all. The unintelligibility of
judging p and refusing to judge p is even stronger than the unintelligibility of judging
x is an F G and refusing to judge x is a G. So I think we should take Reflexivity to be
constitutive of thinking, and this means that we need a response to the bootstrapping
problem raised above.
At this point my response is fairly similar to my response to the first two problems.
First, the inference from p to p is correct in light of Reflexivity. Second, anyone
who understands p must find this transition (really a degenerate case of ‘transition’)
primitively compelling. Third, if someone does not find this transition primitively
compelling, they are not thinking. None of this means that if you believe something,
you ought to believe it.
5.3 Bridge principles
In this section I compare my approach to logical normativity with recent approaches
centred on developing ‘bridge principles’.
A general strategy common to recent approaches to logical normativity is to argue
that the normativity of logic consists in the holding of a ‘bridge principle’, which is a
weakened version of the Simple Formulation above, of the following form:
Bridge Principle If p entails q, [normative statement about cognitive attitudes to p
and q].40
Bridge principles are developed so as to avoid the implausible consequences of the
Simple Formulation. For example, a principle which avoids all three problems might
be:
If p entails q, you ought not to believe p while disbelieving q, unless q is false.
As this principle does not enjoin you to believe anything, it does not enjoin cluttering
your mind with useless consequences, nor believing the things you happen to already
believe. Nor does the rule prohibit disbelieving a consequence of your beliefs if the
consequence is false. I’d like to make three remarks by way of comparing my account
to the bridge principle strategy. This comparison will shed light on my own account,
provide additional motivation for a particular class of bridge principles, and also raise
a question about the larger explanatory role of bridge principles. First, I will show
that it is possible to generate a bridge principle from my account. Second, however,
40This literature begins with MacFarlane (2004); for more discussion see Field (2009), Broome (2013)
and Steinberger (2019a). A fully general bridge principle would, of course, allow for multiple premises.
It is also possible that more than one bridge principle is required, in order to capture different varieties
of logical normativity (Steinberger 2019c), but I will ignore this detail here.
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the bridge principle is open-ended, rather than attempting to specify when we should,
or should not, draw a valid inference, and I will offer some principled reasons to
think this is the right approach. Third, I will contrast the explanatory role of bridge
principles on my account from the role they have in many discussions: it is often
suggested that bridge principles bridge a gap between logic and thinking, but on my
account this is not so.
First, then, it is possible to state a bridge principle in my account. To do this, we
have to make a modification to the form above. The antecedent of the form above is
‘If p entails q’, but in my account the relation that thinkers must be responsive to is
not entailment in general, but entailment in light of particular logical rules. Let us
say that p ‘directly entails’ q if and only if the transition from p to q is correct in light
of a single application of a logical rule.41 (For example, p directly entails if p, then
p, but does not directly entail if p, then if p, then p.42 The antecedent of my bridge
principle must invoke direct entailment rather than entailment.
What about the consequent of the bridge principle? Initially, it seems like all we
have is:
If p directly entails q, then if you believe p you must find the transition to q primitively
compelling.
If we wanted to build in more detail, we could say:
If p directly entails q, then if you believe p, and if the question arises whether q, you
have a reason to believe q, unless other factors override this.
But we have to be careful about ‘reason’ here. This ‘reason’ is just an articulation of
the primitive compulsion a subject feels in virtue of having a disposition to conform
to a logical rule. It is not a justifying reason (an ‘other things being equal it would be
good if. . . ’ reason), because a subject could have a similar reason in virtue of being
disposed to conform to the rule for ‘tonk’ (Prior 1960). Rather, it is an explanatory
reason – a motivational state which could explain the subject’s action (Parfit 1997;
Alvarez 2017). And this means that we do not yet have a genuine bridge principle:
a bridge principle has a normative statement as its consequent, but a claim about
explanatory reasons is not a normative statement. Similar remarks apply to ‘must’ in
the previous formulation of the principle.
However, in my account thinking does have genuine normative status, and a failure
to find the right transitions primitively compelling means a failure to think. In other
words, while the principle above simply describes what it is to have a disposition to
conform to logical rules, the value of thinking means that we have a reason – indeed,
a need – to have such a disposition. This, I think, allows us to say that if p directly
41We can define entailment as the transitive closure of direct entailment. p entails q if and only if for
some set {p1, p2,. . . pn}, p directly entails p1, p1 directly entails p2, . . . and pn directly entails q.
42Compare Field’s (2009) notion of ‘obvious’ entailment and the diachronic norms discussed by Hlobil
(2015).)
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entails q, someone who believes p does have a justifying (as well as explanatory)
reason to believe q. If they refuse to believe q, this raises doubts about whether they
are thinking. So we have:
If p directly entails q, then if you believe p, and if the question arises whether q, you
have a reason to believe q, unless other factors override this.
This (fairly weak) bridge principle is true in my account.
To be clear, this bridge principle is not particularly novel. It is a reasons-based,
rather than ought-based principle, like that of Sainsbury (2002). This puts it in
tension with the ‘Strictness Test’ that MacFarlane (2004) draws from Broome (1999):
essentially that pro tanto reasons are too weak to properly capture logical normativity.
The intuitive worry is that reasons-based bridge principles make it too easy for other
considerations to override logical reasons. In my view, some of the force of this
objection comes from conflating explanatory and justifying reasons. The explanatory
reasons generated by logical dispositions may, indeed, be hard to override: if you
believe p, and p directly entails q, you can’t choose not to believe q merely because
you are offered some money. But the justifying reasons generated by logic are pro
tanto, as there may be good reason, all things considered, to try to bring it about that
you disbelieve q, even if it follows from some p which you accept.
This leads to the second remark I want to make. The bridge principle in my
account is open-ended, containing a reference to overriding considerations, rather
than attempting to specify when we should, and when we should not, draw a valid
inference. This is a feature it shares with other reasons-based bridge principles
(MacFarlane 2004). This contrasts with some other investigations of the normativity
of logic, which aim at finding a plausible bridge principle which avoids implausible
consequences while still providing some reasonably strong normativity. The way these
accounts avoid implausible consequences is by building a bridge principle explicitly
to avoid them – for example, building in an exception for cases where the conclusion
of the entailment is false. The resulting bridge principle satisfies the Strictness Test,
specifying when we should, and should not, draw a valid inference. My account
generates some novel reasons of principle to think this is the wrong strategy.
To show this, I want to develop an analogy. Consider the normativity of promising.
I think – as did Anscombe (1969) – that an account of the normativity of promising
should be composed of two parts. First, there is the rule of promising – the rule you
have to tend to follow in order to count as promising. Plausibly, this rule is simply
‘keep your promises, unless released from doing so by the promisee’. Second, however,
there is an account of why promising is something we should go in for. Here there
are a range of options: virtue theories, contract theories, consequentialist theories
and so on (Habib 2018).
Now, what about a promise to commit murder? Such a promise should not be
kept: so should we say that the rule of promising is really ‘keep your promises, unless
released from doing so by the promisee, or unless the promise is to commit murder’?
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In my view, we should not. Having a tendency to follow the rule of promising does
not require that you follow the rule in every case; it is consistent with this tendency
that you sometimes override it when there are good reasons to do so. If we built
all the exceptions there are into the rule of promising, what we would end up with
would not be an account of the normativity proprietary to promising; it would be an
account of general morality contained as exceptions to promise-keeping.
Similarly, I do not think we should incorporate the rule against believing false-
hoods, or other good epistemic rules, into an account of the normativity of logic. The
result would no longer be an account of the normativity proprietary to logic; it would
be an account of good epistemic conduct. Of course, an account of the normativity of
logic will be part of an account of good epistemic conduct – this much is reflected in
the open-endedness of my bridge principle – but that does not mean that we should
be able to read off the latter from the former, any more than we should be able to
read off the wrongness of murder from our account of the normativity of promising.
If this is right, then there are reasons of principle for rejecting the Strictness Test as a
constraint on bridge principles.
Finally, I’d like to end by spelling out a deep difference between my account and
a view of logic and thinking that motivates much work on bridge principles: namely,
that these principles bridge a gap between logic and thinking. The idea that there is
such a gap derives from Gilbert Harman (1986, 6). Steinberger explains the idea as
follows (2019a, 307; citation omitted):
The traditional conception whereby logic occupies a normative role in our
cognitive economy rests upon the mistake of conflating (or at least running
too closely together) principles of deductive logic with what Harman calls
‘a theory of reasoning’. Yet the two enterprises—formulating a deductive
logic and formulating a normative theory of reasoning—are fundamentally
different according to Harman. A theory of reasoning is a theory of how
ordinary agents should go about managing their beliefs. ... In short,
Harman’s explanation of our intuitions to the effect that logic must have
a normative role to play in reasoning is that we conflate deductive logic
and theories of reasoning. Little wonder, then, that we take there to be
an intimate relation between logic and norms of belief: the relation is
simply that of identity! However, once we are disabused of this confusion,
Harman maintains, we are left with ‘a gap’. The question is whether that
gap separating logic and norms of reasoning can be bridged.
Bridge principles are then conceived as a way to bridge the gap. This is reflected in
the form of the principles: the antecedent is a claim about thoughts or sentences,
saying nothing about thinking, while the consequent is a claim about thinking. Given
that the claim about thinking is a normative one, the suggestion is that what bridges
the gap between logic and thinking is the normativity of logic.43 If normativity is
43This suggestion is not essential to the study of bridge principles: it would be possible to frame them
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what bridges the gap between logic and thinking, and the correct bridge principle
specifies that normativity, then the correct bridge principle is not just true, but also
fundamental in an explanation of how logic relates to thinking.
The account I’ve developed in this paper has a very different shape. On my
account, a bridge principle is true, but it is derivative, rather than fundamental, in
an explanation of how logic relates to thinking. Of course, this point isn’t meant as
an objection to Harman, or to the bridge principles literature: that would require
defending the constitutive position, which I haven’t done here. But it is still worth
spelling out the difference in approach, because it helps us to clarify the theoretical
ambitions of an account of logical normativity.
On my own account, the correct bridge principle does not bridge a gap between
logic and thinking. If there is such a gap, then what bridges it is that logic is constitutive
of thinking – i.e. that thinkers have to tend to conform to logical rules in order to
think. But given the way I defined ‘logic’ as a set of inference-rules operating on
thoughts, it might be better to say that, on my own account, there is no gap at all
between logic and thinking. As a result, it would be possible to give an explanation
of how logic relates to thinking, and of why logic is normative for thinking, without
any reference to bridge principles.
This possibility should force us to clarify what we are after in studying bridge
principles. We might simply be interested in finding some truth about the normative
force of logic. In that case, seeking a satisfactory bridge principle may be a good
strategy. But – as suggested by talk of a ‘gap’ between logic and thinking – we might
also be interested in giving a fundamental explanation of how logic relates to thinking.
In that case, we should not take for granted that bridge principles are the place to
start.44
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